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Francis Bacon’s philosophy of experiment has been often subject to fierce debates, and sometimes 
thoroughly abused in the writings of historians of philosophy or historians and philosophers of science. 
Despite the obvious central role of experiment and experimentation in Bacon’s writings, it is still not 
entirely clear how we would answer today to any of the following questions:  
 
1. What is the relation between Bacon’s speculative philosophy (i.e. cosmology and theory of matter) 
and his performed or imagined experiments?  
2. What is the role of experimentation in general (in natural history or in natural philosophy)?  
3. Why do natural philosophers have to do experiments at all?  
 
Attempts have been made to read Bacon in a purely inductivist manner, as starting with observations 
and experiments, establishing some theory-free facts and constructing from them, through some sort of 
inductive reasoning, axioms and laws (Daston 1991, Park 1995). There were also attempts to read Bacon 
as a hypothetico deductivist: as starting with conjectures and theoretical statements and using 
experiments to test, confirm or reject theoretical statements (Urbach 1981). Yet other attempts tend to 
picture Bacon as a proto-Bayesian: as using experiments to amass evidence for a more probable 
conjecture and amend his theory accordingly (Manzo 2007). Last but not least, there are ways of reading 
Bacon in such a way that his natural and experimental history is no more than a feeble illustration of his 
metaphysical or cosmological theory of matter, or even a rhetorical device for enlisting actual or future 
help in realizing the societal and communitarian program of Instauratio Magna (Rees 2007).  
 
In part, such divergent interpretations originate in the peculiar structure of Bacon’s description of 
experimentation and experimental procedures – still the least investigated parts of his works.  
 
For Francis Bacon, the proper objects of philosophy, the ‘principles, fountains, causes and forms of 
motions, that is, the ‘appetites’ and ‘passions’ of every kind of matter’ (OFB V 246) are to be 
investigated throughout a thoroughly regulated experimental procedure designed by the name 
experientia literata. In a characteristic metaphorical fashion, Bacon pictures his experimental 
methodology as a way of torturing nature or chaining the god Proteus and hence obliging the multi-
faceted nature to change shape and reveal its secrets. In Bacon’s speculative philosophy (Rees 1993, 
2007) natural processes are the result of the active powers of the spirits enclosed in the tangible bodies. 
Spirits are “the most active of bodies” (SS I. 98) and it is from spirits “and their motions” that the 
majority of processes proceed. All properties of bodies ultimately arise from the ‘appetites and desires’ 
of pneumatic matter (OFB V 451-2). Experimenting with matter or chaining Proteus means, in fact, 
experimenting with spirits, reaching, through experiments, to the sources of motion and causation that 
lie at the origin of all physical phenomena.  
 
How is this investigation possible?  
 
For the mechanical philosopher, the bridge between the realm of the visible and the invisible world is to 
postulate a fundamental similarity between macroscopic/visible phenomena and what happens at the 
microscopic level. Collisions, for example, are relevant from the point of view of the experimenter 
because of the postulate stating that in the visible and invisible world, particles or macroscopic bodies 
collide in the same way, like billiard balls, for example. Hence, it is relevant to study the macroscopic 
collisions and investigate the empirical laws governing this phenomenon. In Bacon’s non-mechanical 
philosophy, however, no such postulate of similarity is at work. There is no reason to believe that the 
invisible spirits trapped in bodies act in any way similar with the macroscopic bodies we can see and 
experience. What is, then, the relevance of experimentation?  
 
One important point worth noticing is, of course, Bacon’s materialism. There is no ontological difference 
between spirits or pneumatics in general and tangible bodies. They are all material and, what is even 
more important, they can be transformed into one another. Such ‘phase-transformations’ are extremely 
important in Bacon’s natural histories and a lot of experiments are constructed around them. Another 
important point is that spirits and matter are subject to the general conservation law stating that the 
total quantity of matter (tangible and pneumatic) in the universe is constant. All this, however, is not 
sufficient to bridge the gap between the observable and the unobservable, between the visible 
phenomena and the invisible actions of the spirits.  
 
What is, then, the relevance of Baconian experimentation?  
 
It is my suggestion in this paper to abandon the standard view that Baconian experiments function as 
evidence. Instead, by looking into the way experiments were put together, varied and exploited in 
Bacon’s Latin natural histories, I will suggest alternative functions for experimentation in general, and a 
more sophisticated relation between theory and experiments.  
 
In this paper I will investigate in depth a number of Baconian experiments with spirits taken respectively 
from Historia densi et rari, Historia ventorum, Historia vitae et mortis and Sylva Sylvarum. I will first 
show the way they were put together as applications of Bacon’s own art of experientia literata, using 
instruments, instrumental set-ups and a complex methodology of experimentation. I will then 
emphasize their theoretical presuppositions and their connection with Bacon’s matter theory. I will in 
the end attempt to explain three potential functions of experimentation that have received little 
attention so far. Firstly, I will show that experiments can serve as models for understanding more 
complex phenomena. Secondly, I will show in what way experiments can work as classificatory devices 
in Bacon’s own cosmological scheme/matter theory. Thirdly, I will discuss the therapeutic role of 
experimentation, showing in what ways experiments, by providing ‘ministrations’ for the senses, 
memory and intellect, contribute to a more general program of ‘medicining the mind’. 
 
